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Argument 
After trial, the findings made by the trial court were inadequate to justify the 
legal conclusion that Appellant Bayles had been stalking Appellee Bailey. No effort 
was made by Appellee Bailey to seek clarification of the findings or request a new 
trial. Appellee Bailey did not argue to the Court of Appeals that an alternate 
justification in fact or law merited affirmance of the trial court. Thus, many of the 
situations when "affirm on any ground" or "equitable review" has been properly 
applied do not apply in this case. 
In addition, Appellee Bailey's arguments fail to demonstrate that while 
affirming on alternate grounds the Court of Appeals provided to Appellant Bayles 
either (1) the procedural protections afforded by Article I § 7 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment tc the Unite~ 3tates1 Constitution, or (2) the substantive protections 
required by the provisions of Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution. Having failed to 
do both, the Court of Appeals' decision should be vacated and instructions given to 
direct that the trial court opinion also be vacated. 
I. Legal and Equitable Precedent Allowing Appellate Affirmance 
Do Not Apply to This Case 
The re-interpretation and re-application by the court of appeals of alleged facts 
and argument presented to the trial court is not justified by standard legal doctrines 
or practice. As such, the first three arguments presented by Appellee Bailey do not 
have merit. 
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A. Court of Appeals Affirmance Is Not Justified Under Existing Doctrines 
Allowing for Legal and Equitable Affirmance on Any Grounds 
Whether based on affirmance on any ground, re-finding of facts for equitable 
reasons, or proper application of the existing precedent of Strollo v. Strollo.1 the 
affirmance of the court of appeals is erroneous. 
1. "Affirm on Any Ground" As A Matter of Law 
The doctrine of appellate "affirm on any ground" has been applied in Utah 
jurisprudence in many different types of situations. The doctrine has been applied 
where the trial court made legal rulings on motions for summary judgment2 or 
motions to dismiss.3 Other opinions have affirmed on alternate legal grounds when 
the trial court findings established the factual foundation for the legal determination,4 
1
 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
2DeBry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995); Allphin Realty. Inc. v. Sine. 595 
P.2d 860 (Utah 1979). 
3
 O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991). 
4
 Buhner Block Company v. BUWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1988) (interpretation of an integrated, non-ambiguous contract provision); Rice. 
Melbv Enterprises. Inc. v. Salt Lake County. 646 P.2d 696, 698 & n. 3 (Utah 
1982). 
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the alternate ground for affirmance was "apparent in the record and was briefed and 
argued by the parties on appeal,"5 or the appellate court had a "complete factual 
record before [them], and defendants' arguments raise purely legal questions."6 
The mainstay opinion used by the court of Appeals was Strollo v. Strollo.7 
This was an opinion that ruled as a matter of law on uncontested factual allegations 
in a complaint because the trial judge had granted a motion to dismiss the complaint. 
As noted in Appellant Bayles' opening brief, because the court of appeals re-
interpreted and applied alleged facts that were not found to be satisfied by a 
preponderance of the evidence by the trial before the trial court, (Opening Brief at 
pages 7-11), affirming on alternate legal grounds when undisputed factual claims 
are present does not apply to this case. 
2. Re-Interpreting Factual Claims in Equitable Cases 
When dealing vv'th equitable claims, 
[i]t is true that in cases of equity this Court may weigh the evidence and 
determine the facts. However, it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged position of the trial court, there is 
indulged a presumption of correctness of the findings and judgment; 
and that where the evidence may conflict we do not upset the lower 
court's findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates against 
them.8 
5
 Dipoma v. McPhie. 2001 UT 61 If 18, 426 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (2001). 
6
 Utah v. Finalvson. 2001 UT 10 If 31, 994 P.2d 1243 (2000). 
7
 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
8
 Ovard v. Cannon. 600 P.2d 1246,1248 (Utah 1979). 
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It is inappropriate in most instances for an appellate court to disregard 
the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and to assume 
the task of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact. The 
appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity 
and should defer to the trial court on factual matters. . . .In certain 
instances, the appellate court may exercise equitable powers and take 
upon itself the responsibility of weighing the evidence and making its 
own findings of fact.. .However, this exception must not become merely 
a guise under which an appellate court substitutes its own judgment for 
that of the trial court. The appellate court must have a valid reason to 
take this extraordinary step and then only when the appellate court is 
in an equal position with the trial court with respect to the facts and 
evidence at issue.9 
The appellate court does 
not engage in a review of the evidence which duplicates the task of the 
trial court. Rather, we assess the quality and quantity of the evidence 
to determine if it "clearly preponderates" against the trial court's finding 
that the appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied.10 
An appellate court is "not at liberty to reject the trial court's rulings only on the basis 
of an unsubstantiated belief that the finding is inaccurate."11 
The court of appeals has not established why its was necessary to take an 
"extraordinary step" of re-weighing the evidence presented to the trial court, 
especially when no claim was made by Appellee Bailey that the findings of fact of the 
trial court were erroneous or lacking. Furthermore, since it claimed that it was 
9
 Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Utah 1997). 
10
 Estate of Hock v. Zion's First National Bank. 655 P.2d 1111,1114 & n. 1 
(Utah 1982) (emphasis in original.) 
11
 Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). 
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relying on "specific findings or undisputed evidence,"12 it can not claim the benefit of 
making its own equitable findings. 
3. Strollo v. Strollo13 Was Erroneously Applied 
to Affirm the Trial Court 
The majority panel of the court of appeals used the precedent of Strollo v. 
Strollo to recast the trial court's findings of fact and the application of law to affirm 
the trial court on alternate grounds. There is conflicting precedent regarding whether 
or not an Appellee may raise "an argument in defense of the lower court's judgment 
when the argument was not presented in the lower court".14 If this Court were to find 
that the legal argument must have been raised in the lower court, the use of Strollo 
v. Strollo to recast the facts and law in the case brought by Appellee Bailey was in 
error because of the context in which it was raised in the trial court. 
Strollo v. Strollo focused on whether or not a preliminary injunction should 
have been issued under the Cohabitant Abuse Act.15 The case had been dismissed 
because the trial judge had not found there to be "eminent harm" even though there 
were allegations that the spouse had been beaten for eight and one-half years and 
was in fear of further harm. The most recent abuse had occurred approximately 
12
 Bailey v.Bavles. 2001 UT App 34, K 10, 18 P.3d 1129 (2001). 
13
 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
14
 State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 & n.3 (1996); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 
145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
15
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 to -11 (1989 & Supp 1991). 
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eight months earlier and required the spouse to seek medical care and residence in 
a shelter. Approximately one month before the filing, the spouse seeking relief had 
been threatened with death if a divorce was sought. The trial court's denial of the 
initial request was error because "[t]he statute clearly protects those who are 
reasonably in fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct coupled with present 
threat of future harm."16 
For at least six reasons, the precedent of Strollo v. Strollo to re-frame facts 
and legal issues. First, the Strollo case was appealed on the basis of a motion to 
dismiss; hence, all allegations made had to be taken as being true. In this case, the 
appeal arose from a hotly disputed trial in the context of determining whether or not 
the already stipulated to preliminary order would be made permanent. Second, the 
claimed urgency of needed physical protection - threatened death one month 
previous - is absent. Both the original petition and argument of counsel indicated 
that no physical abuse had occurred since 1994, five years before the trial.17 It was 
uncontested that in the parties divorce proceeding, a mutual restraining order had 
been lifted eleven months prior to the filing of the protective order.18 Third, no 
evidence was ever alleged or introduced showed Appellant Bailey had been to any 
16
 Strollo v. Strollo. supra. 828 P.2d at 534-45. 
17
 Record 168 at page 466, lines 7-14 (Counsel for Appellant Bayles); page 
496, line 24 - page 497, line 2 (Counsel for Appellee Bailey.) 
18
 Record 168, pg. 475, line 21 - page 476, line 8. 
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shelter or medical treatment had been obtained by Appellee Bailey because of the 
conduct of Appellant Bailey.19 Fourth, some 1991 of the out-of-state precedent relied 
upon by the appellate court and Appellee Bailey in closing argument20 that defined 
abuse as including acts that would cause another to be "worried, anxious, or 
uncomfortable,"21 a doctrine that appears to be contrary to the precedent of Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez22 and related precedent requiring that emotional stress be shown 
by either physical symptoms or mental illness.23 Fifth, in closing argument, Appellee 
Bailey presented Strollo v. Strollo in the context of the stalking statute and Salt Lake 
City v. Lopez opinion. The argument was made that when there has been an 
abusive marriage over time, the totality of the situation must be examined, likely 
lending itself to a subjective rather than objective ("reasonable person") standard for 
determining whether or not emotional distress occurred.24 Sixth, not only were no 
19
 "[T]he court did not find.. .that plaintiff [Bayles] suffered from more than 
anxiety or annoyance, perhaps because plaintiff put on no objective evidence 
thereof." Bailev v. Bavles. 2001 UT App 34, fl 27, 18 P.3d 1129, 1136 (Davis, J., 
dissenting.) 
20
 Record 168, page 480, lines 17-22. 
21
 See, In re Marriage of Blistein. 212 III. App. 3d 124, 155 III. Dec. 746, 569 
N.E.2d 1357 (1991), cited in Strollo v. Strollo. supra, at 534 & n.2. 
22
 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
23
 Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co..858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993); 
Record 168, at page 454, line 19 - page 455, line 19. 
24
 Record 168, page 479, line 11 - 486, line 20. Counsel for Appellee Bailey 
indicated that the court of appeals was "saying look at everything, look at it in its 
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"extraordinary circumstances" present to justify an equitable re-weighing of factual 
matters before the trial court, the court of appeals was not in the same position of the 
trial court judge who saw and observed the demeanor of witnesses and the quality 
of other evidence submitted.25 
B. The Justifications Offered By Appellee Bailey for Affirmance 
By the Court of Appeals Are Without Merit 
Based on the foregoing arguments and the reasons that follow, the first three 
arguments raised in the Brief of Appellee Bailey must fail. 
totality, and that way Strollo. I believe suggests that it's a subjective sort of 
response or a subjective sort of standard."Jd., page 483, lines 2-5. However, it 
was also argued "I think that the Court has to look at that in some sense - I 
mean in some sense it is subjective and objective and I am (inaudible) the line, I 
realize that, but the Court has to decide that in order to apply to Cohabitant 
Abuse Act that there's some reasonableness to the person's fear. Because I 
don't think the could be in a position that said "Okay, all you have to come in and 
say is 'I'm afraid,' therefore you get this cohabitant abuse order on your side," 
because I think it would become unmanageable in many ways, this act has 
become unmanageable and has been misused... .1 think it just becomes a 
difficult question, so I don't think the line is so easy to draw on the objective and 
subjective, and I realize I'm arguing inconsistently, but I don't think there's any 
other choice in these types of cases, because the Court has to make a 
determination." id., page 483, line 23 - page 485, line 2. The nature of fear in the 
context of this case and State v. Lopez was also discussed, jd-, page 485, line 
13 -page 487, line 7. 
25Willeyv.Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Utah 1997). ("The appellate court 
must have a valid reason to take this extraordinary step and then only when the 
appellate court is in an equal position with the trial court with respect to the facts 
and evidence at issue.") 
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1. Appellate Court Affirming on Non-found Factual Findings Must Fail 
As noted above, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court by giving weight 
and credibility to factual allegations in the petition that the trial court did not find were 
proven. A stipulation that certain evidence may be admitted is not a stipulation that 
it is accepted as being true; a trial court is to required to accept each piece of 
evidence as a proven fact just because it receives a statement regarding the same.26 
Contrary to the assertions of Appellant Bailey at page 12 of her brief, the issue is not 
whether the limited findings of the trial court were contradicted by the court of 
appeals novel findings of fact; rather, underWillevv. Willev. the issue is whether or 
not (1) there existed extraordinary circumstances to merit such action and (2) the 
appellate court was in the same position as the trial court to consider the evidence. 
Had the appellate case been decided on summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, 
stipulated facts, or sole'\ on the findings made by the trial court, there could be 
possible justification for the action by the court of appeals. However, as there is not, 
the use of facts not found by a trial court must fail. 
On pages 11-12 of her brief, Appellant Bailey claims that the findings of 
additional facts by the court of appeals was justified for at least three reasons. First, 
both Appellee and Appellant were at fault for not objecting to the trial court over 
insufficient findings of fact or asking for more specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Second, since both parties and the court "went off on a tangent 
26
 See Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1997). 
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about elements of the criminal stalking statute," it was proper for the court of appeals 
to clarify what is required as a matter of law to prevail under the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act. Third, being in a similar position to the trial court, its enlargement on factual 
findings was not improper. Upon closer examination, all three arguments fail. 
In a proceeding seeking to establish the factual basis for a permanent 
protective order, the burden of proof is on the party seeking the injunction. A party 
seeking a permanent injunction carries the burden of ensuring that adequate findings 
of fact are made to justify a desired result legal conclusion. Especially when an 
opposing party has argued thoroughly the legal standard to be applied at the trial 
level, a failure of the trial court to find facts to support the same may be preserved 
as a tactical matter for an appeal. 
The parties and the trial court focused at trial and on appeal on the standards 
of criminal stalking because that is the legal standard pled by Appellee Bailey in her 
opening petition. 
Finally, since the factual allegations of the petition were at issue and hotly 
disputed at the trial court level,27 the appellate court could not have been in the same 
position of the trial court as it related to weighing the credibility of the evidence and 
the witnesses. Without this, making an equitable re-determination of facts was in 
error. 
27
 See Record 168, page 455 at line 20 - page 477, line 24 (summary of 
factual arguments presented by Counsel for Appellant Bayles.) 
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2. Appellate Court Affirming on Non-contextual Legal Grounds Must Fail 
Appellee Bailey argued Strollo v. Strollo was argued to the trial court to 
define the nature of the "reasonableness of fear" as required by the criminal stalking 
statute.28 At no time was Strollo v. Strollo used to argue at trial that the initial petition 
should be accepted at face value as evidence of "domestic abuse" and the 
permanent order issue. This leads to misuse of disputed evidence by the changing 
of the legal context in which it is admitted. Justice Davis observed his concern as 
follows: 
Specifically, the majority's affirmance of the trial court relies on 
evidence from the record, admitted in support of Bailey's claim, and 
applies to a completely different claim. As a result, this court is 
reshaping the relevance and importance of evidence that was 
presented against Bayles by the earlier proceeding. Such an approach 
is improper in the present case because, had Bayles been aware that 
certain testimony was or would become determinative of the different 
case decided by the court of appeals, his trial strategy and/or 
arguments on appeal may have changed dramatically. Similarly, had 
the trial court heard the case now decided by the court of appeals and 
the evidence relied upon by the court of appeals in that context, its 
findings, conclusions, and rulings may have been totally different... .1 
am also troubled by the majority's reliance on instances on abuse that 
allegedly occurred anywhere from four to twenty-five years before the 
petition for a protective order was filed. While the trial court relied on 
that evidence to support its conclusion relative to Bayles knowledge or 
constructive knowledge, the majority, without any opportunity for the 
parties or the trial court to address the issue, uses the evidence as 
direct evidence of a substantively different type of domestic violence.29 
28
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999); State v. Lopez, supra. 935 P.2d 
at 1264. 
29
 Bailev v. Bayles. 2001 UT App 34, fl 19 & n.5, 18 P.3d 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001) (Davis, J., dissenting.) 
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3. The Trial Court Found Insufficient Factual Evidence 
to Uphold the Elements of Stalking 
For reasons noted in the dissent of Justice Davis and the opening brief of 
Appellant Bayles, the factual findings of the trial court were insufficient to satisfy the 
elements of the stalking statute.30 
On page 14 of her brief, Appellee Bailey questions why "should anyone be 
forced to endure stalking until her psychological being is seriously damaged to the 
point where she needs psychological and/or medical intervention?" Overlooked are 
the facts that (1) this proof was only necessary because the trial court rejected the 
claim of Appellee Bailey that there was a reasonable fear of bodily harm and (2) the 
evidentiary burden as to emotional distress was well-established in existing case law 
that was specifically brought to the trial court's attention and addressed by counsel 
for Appellee at the trial level. 
While the majority panel of the court of appeals and Appellee Bailey may have 
wished that the trial court had made additional or different findings of fact, making 
statements of fact - even under oath - does not make them so as a matter of law 
in the absence of a determination by a trier of fact that they are so. Because the 
findings of fact of the trier of fact have failed to satisfy the statutory standard selected 
by Appellee Bailey in formulating her request for a temporary and permanent 
30
 Bailey v. Bavles. supra, 2001 UT App 34, ffl| 25-28; Opening Brief of 
Randee Bayles, Appellant, pages 12-14. 
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protective order, a post-trial, post-appeal argument regarding the unfairness of the 
legal standard must fail. 
II. The Conduct of the Court of Appeals Has Violated the Right of 
Appellant Bayles to Due Process of Law31 
Appellee Bailey has correctly observed this Court has stated that the 
application of the appellate rule that allows affirmance on any ground, even when a 
trial court has relied on another ground, does "not deprive a party of due process."32 
Nonetheless, sua sponte consideration of issues not raised in the trial court below 
should be prohibited as a violation of due process. 
In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances which are 
not present here, all parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue 
is being considered by a court and an opportunity to present evidence 
and argument on that issue before decision.33 
"It has always been our policy to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have 
their day in court on the merits of a controversy."34 "Because of these significant 
constitutional concerns, the courts generally strongly disfavor sua sponte 
consideration of arguments and issues not raised by either party, without the 
31
 No distinction is being made between the rights afforded by Article I § 7 of 
the Utah Constitution and that afforded by the XIV Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
32
 Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
33
 Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990). 
34
 Celebrity Club Incorporated vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 657 P.2d 
1293,1296 (Utah 1982). 
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adversely affected party receiving notice and being allowed to respond."35 Not only 
are federal and state constitutional due process rights at issue, but public policy 
issues that favor a vibrant adversary system as a means of finding legal truth, the 
reviewing role of appellate courts, and the requirements of various Rules of 
Appellate Procedure are also denigrated if sua sponte consideration of issues not 
raised on appeal are used to affirm a trial court's result after different factual findings 
are made while applying the one's made in a different legal context.36 
There does not appear to be any compelling or rational reason why the court 
of appeals could not have asked for additional briefing on the applicability of the law 
it chose to use or the correctness of the factual additions it made to the record. In the 
absence of such, Appellant Bailey was denied due process of law by the lack of 
procedures and means used by the majority of the court of appeals panel to issue 
its ruling in this case. 
III. The Conduct of the Court of Appeals Has Violated the Right of 
Appellant Bayles to Due Course of Law 
On page 16 of her brief, Appellee Bailey implies that the rights protected by 
Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution are the same as those procedural rights 
afforded by the due process Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. This is in error. 
35
 Crook, D. Scott, "Affirming the Untested - Affirming a Trial Court on Issues 
Raised Sua Sponte," 14 Utah State Bar Journal 10, 12-13 (October 2001), and 
federal and state cases cited therein. 
36
 Id. at 13-15. 
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Utah's Article I § 11 "open court" provisions guarantees "remedy by due 
course of law" for a citizens' "person, property, or reputation". 
The meaning of section 11 must be taken not only from its history and 
plain language, but also from its functional relationship to other 
constitutional provisions. Section 11 and the Due Process Clause of 
Article I, Section 7 are related both in their historical origins and to 
some extent in their constitutional functions. To a degree, the two 
provisions are complementary and even overlap, but they are not 
wholly duplicative. Both act to restrict the powers of both courts and the 
Legislature.37 
From the outset, this Court recognized that the requirements of Article I § 11 applied 
to "judicial" acts;38 more recently, this phrase has been interpreted to "guarantee 
access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equity."39 
Application of this protections provided by this phrase "due course of law" to the 
judiciary is in accordance with the initial inclusion of the provisions in early American 
state constitutions to preserve an independent judiciary.40 
In 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a legislatively enacted ninety-day 
time limit for filing a writ of habeas corpus under the provisions of Article I § 11.41 The 
37
 Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). 
38
 Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans. 52 Utah 394, 409,174 P. 825, 831 
(1918). 
39
 Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234,1250 (Utah 1998). cert, denied 526 U.S. 
1130, 119 S.Ct. 1803, 143 LEd.2d 1007 (1999). 
40
 See Hoffman, Jonathan, "By the Course of Law: The Origins of the Open 
Courts Clause of the State Constitutions," 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 (Winter, 1995). 
41
 Currier v.Holden. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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Court of Appeals examined the effect of a ninety-day statute of limitations on filing the 
writ of habeas corpus to determine "(1) the degree to which a statute impairs an 
individual's rights to seek a remedy and (2) the nature of the right impaired."42 Having 
found the rights impaired were expressly protected by provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, the court of appeals found that the challenged conduct required "higher 
scrutiny than minimal deferential review and demand more than a determination that 
a statue does not represent a "case[] of extreme arbitrariness."43 
In his opening brief, Appellant Bayles pointed out that the provisions of Article 
VIII §§ 1 and 5 the Utah Constitution provide that district courts shall be "trial courts" 
and have "original jurisdiction except as limited by the constitution or statute". 
(Opening Brief at 18.) As these rights define the beginning point of the entire judicial 
proceeding - a proceeding to be "based on fairness and equity" - a higher standard 
than simple deference or presumption of constitutionality must be applied to the 
conduct of the court of appeals in this case. 
The court of appeals has not articulated a reason why it was required to 
address issues in this appeal sua sponte, why it could enlarge on disputed facts to 
create more factual findings, or why it applied a legal standard not disclosed in the 
petition for relief or argued on appeal. Without articulated justification, when 
compared with the constitutional right to have evidence evaluated and decided by a 
42 id- at 1363. 
4 3 ld. at 1365. 
Page 16 
trial court, it is improper to presume that the conduct of the majority of the panel is 
constitutional under Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution. Because the conduct of 
the court of appeals regarding factual findings and applying legal argument in a 
context was made when it was never argued or decided before the trial court,44 
(regardless of whether the court of appeals had requested argument before it acted 
sua sponte,) the court of appeals acted unreasonably when its conduct is juxtaposed 
against the requirements of "due course of law" and the protections afforded those 
citizens receiving a trial court under Article VIII §§ 1 and 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
Conclusion 
Legal and equitable precedent allowing affirmance of a trail court's action on 
"any ground" do not apply to this case. Affirmance on legal grounds when there is no 
conflict in facts does not apply to this case. Affirmance on a re-interpretation of facts 
in a case of equity does not apply because the court of appeals claimed they were 
relying on facts that were undisputed or found by the trial court. The precedent of 
Strollo v. Strollo was misapplied to this case fora number of reasons. 
Justifications offered by Appellee Bailey for the conduct of the court of appeals 
must fail. The finding of alternate, supplementary facts fails when there has been no 
44
 Even if it was presumed that the granting of a preliminary injunction was 
based on the court of appeals' newly found factual and legal claims, the 
substitution of any such analysis with the final findings of fact and conclusions 
would obviate the ability to use what was interpreted by appellate justices as 
being a finding by the trial court. See Smith v. DeNiro. 25 Utah2d 294, 296, 480 
P.2d480, 481 (1971). 
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showing of an "extraordinary" circumstances to merit such an action or that the court 
of appeals could evaluate the (disputed) evidence as did the trial court. While the 
precedent of Strollo v. Strollo was used in one context of legal argument in the trial 
court, the appellate court applied the legal precedent in a completely different legal 
context, which in turn gave a different emphasis and cast to evidence found and that 
submitted in the trial court. Under these facts, no legal argument (as used by the 
Court of Appeals) was made. Finally, the findings of the trial court do not adequately 
demonstrate under statutory requirements and existing case law that Appellant 
Bayles engaged in stalking Appellee Bailey. 
The sua sponte conduct of the court of appeals - without notice to either of the 
parties on appeal - denied Appellant Bayles his right to due process of law under the 
Utah and United States Constitution. There were no extraordinary conditions that 
justified refusing to allow the parties to comment on new factual findings and legal 
arguments made by the court of appeals that neither party made in the trial court or 
to the court of appeals. To allow the same not only violates constitutional due 
process provisions, but denigrates judicial policies favoring a strong adversary 
system, the reviewing role of appellate courts, and the requirements of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Even if the court of appeals had given notice to the parties of its intended 
course of action and asked for supplemental briefing, the rights of Appellant Bailey 
to "due course of law" under Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution would have been 
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denied. Article VIII §§ 1 and 5 of the Utah Constitution protect the original jurisdiction 
of a district courts, a "trial court," except as limited by the constitution or statute. 
Applying the provisions of Article I § 11 to create a judicial procedure based on 
"fairness and equity," requires at least a higher scrutiny than minimal review when 
judicial conduct interferes with a citizen's right to protect his "person, property, or 
reputation" in state courts. No rationale was provided by the court of appeals to 
infringe on the rights of Appellant Bayles; hence, the reasonableness of the conduct 
must fail. By failing, the affirming conduct of the court of appeals violated Article I § 
11 must be struck down. 
Because the trial court's decision failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for 
stalking, and the court of appeals' affirmance of the same must be struck down, the 
granting of a permanent protective order against Appellant Bayles must be reversed. 
DATED and EXECUTED this 3rd day of December, 2001. 
Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton, P.C. 
Attorney for Randy Bayles, Appellant 
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